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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Joshua Derek Cutler 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Private Litigation as a Regulator of Accounting Standards 
 
 
I examine the impact of the trend of private class actions targeting alleged 
violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). I document the specific 
allegations in GAAP lawsuits and find that allegations involving revenue recognition and 
asset impairment recognition are two of the most common areas of GAAP cited. I test 
whether lawsuits lead to a reduction in the allegedly improper behavior, whether sued 
firms and their peers make other financial reporting changes, and whether these changes 
change firms’ stock price characteristics. I find that following relevant lawsuits, sued 
firms, firms in the same industry, and firms with a shared auditor generally exhibit less 
aggressive revenue recognition, but firms may increase aggressive revenue recognition in 
certain cases. Next, I examine the impact of asset impairment recognition allegations on 
the reporting of negative special items. I find few changes directly associated with these 
allegations but show that other litigation is associated with both increases and decreases 
in the propensity and size of negative special item reporting. I note that GAAP violations 
most often arise in an attempt to meet or beat analysts’ estimates, and I show following 
litigation firms are often more likely to beat analysts’ expectations by a larger margin. I 
also find significant increases in real earnings management of sued firms and their peers 
following many lawsuits, indicating a shift away from accruals-based management 
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towards real activities management. Finally, I find mixed evidence of changes in stock 
return attributes. In some cases I observe significant changes consistent with reduced 
litigation risk and in others I observe the opposite. The results have implications for 
accounting standard setting and show that the legal system plays a critical role in shaping 
the financial reporting environment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Private securities litigation alleging violations of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) has become increasingly common over the last two decades. This 
phenomenon is a side effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 
The PSLRA aimed to reduce frivolous litigation by creating difficult hurdles that plaintiffs must 
overcome at the beginning of a lawsuit. Chiefly, plaintiffs must point to facts indicating that 
managers acted intentionally when making material misstatements. One method plaintiffs have 
used to meet this requirement is to focus on cases where there is an apparent violation of GAAP 
(Johnson, Nelson, & Pritchard, 2007; Choi, Nelson & Pritchard, 2009). While not dispositive, 
many courts will consider GAAP violations as evidence of intent, and prior literature indicates 
that cases alleging GAAP violations are more likely to result in settlements for the plaintiffs 
(Cutler, Davis, & Peterson, 2014). Therefore, accounting standards are now an important 
determinant of which cases are brought to court and which cases result in settlements. Perhaps 
more importantly, every time a court issues an opinion in a GAAP-related case, it can essentially 
become part of GAAP. An opinion addressing a novel fact situation and/or interpreting the law in 
a new way sets a precedent and provides new information that may change the behavior of firms 
hoping to avoid litigation in the future.  Notably, cases are selected and conducted by private 
plaintiff’s attorneys with a self-interested desire to maximize recoveries, and hence their own 
contingent fees. Actors with a more direct responsibility for influencing and enforcing accounting 
standards, chiefly the SEC and the FASB, often play no direct role in these lawsuits. Auditors are 
another important stakeholder with respect to accounting standards, and while they also do not 
decide what cases are brought to court, they may sometimes find themselves as defendants.  
What are the consequences of an increased role for private litigation in enforcing 
accounting standards? Plaintiff’s attorneys may serve as a useful private supplement to public 
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enforcement of accounting standards, harnessing private incentives to deter bad behavior and 
improve financial reporting, or they may induce other, unintended consequences. To shed light on 
this issue, I test whether private class actions alleging GAAP violations result in measurable 
financial accounting and reporting changes.  
To answer these questions, I first examine all available lawsuit complaints containing 
GAAP allegations and provide descriptive evidence on which elements of GAAP are alleged to 
have been violated. Next, I select two common categories of GAAP violations where I can test 
for subsequent changes directly related to the areas of GAAP targeted in the lawsuit. In addition 
to the sued firms, I also look at peer firms most likely to be impacted by the lawsuit. Specifically, 
I look at firms in the same industry and market decile as the sued firm, and firms who share an 
auditor and geographic proximity with the sued firm. Further, I distinguish lawsuits based on their 
outcome, to see whether any observed effects differ if the lawsuit was dismissed or settled for a 
significant sum. I also measure the number of times a decision in each case is cited in future 
judicial decisions or court documents. Decisions containing more new information, such as 
decisions addressing previously undecided questions of law or novel facts and circumstances, 
should result in a greater number of citations. Lawsuits providing the most new information 
should induce the most changes in financial reporting behavior. 
Based on my search of lawsuit complaints, the first category of GAAP violations I 
examine is improper revenue recognition, by far the most common GAAP allegation. For these 
cases, I test whether litigation affects discretionary revenues, a measure created by Stubben 
(2010) designed to capture aggressive revenue recognition. Another large subset of lawsuits 
alleges that the sued firm improperly delayed or altogether avoided recognizing an asset 
impairment charge, such as a goodwill impairment or inventory write-down. For this group, I test 
for effects on the probability that a firm will report negative special items in the income 
statement, as well as the size of items reported.  
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Next, I test for further, indirect consequences of lawsuits on financial reporting as 
managers attempt to reduce future litigation risk. I note that most alleged GAAP violations occur 
in the context of attempts to meet or surpass analysts’ earnings expectations. Therefore, I test 
whether the frequency of meeting or beating analysts’ consensus earnings estimates changes after 
lawsuits. Relatedly, I test whether GAAP lawsuits induce firms to shift towards managing 
earnings through real earnings management. Real earnings management may allow managers to 
achieve earnings targets without leaving them as vulnerable to litigation. Finally, I attempt to test 
if changes by managers are successful at reducing their litigation risk. Since certain stock return 
patterns are critical determinants of litigation, I test whether any changes in response to litigation 
are successful at reducing these patterns, namely stock return volatility, negative skewness, and 
large 1-day declines. 
My results indicate significant changes in the financial accounting of sued firms and their 
industry and circuit peers. In the revenue recognition tests, I find few results for firms that are 
actually sued or for shared auditor peers. But for industry peers of sued firms, I find that all 
lawsuits, but especially GAAP and revenue recognition lawsuits, are usually associated with 
significantly reduced discretionary revenues, indicating that private litigation is an effective 
deterrent mechanism in this regard. Interestingly though, for industry peers, when an improper 
revenue recognition case is highly cited, there is a significant incremental positive effect on 
discretionary revenues. Managers and practitioners may perceive that these cases clearly spell out 
certain patterns of behavior that will or will not result in liability, creating a form of safe harbor 
that emboldens managers to behave more aggressively.  
When firms are accused of failing to make a timely write-down of an impaired asset, I 
observe changes in NSPI reporting that vary significantly depending on the outcome and type of 
the case. Litigation appears to induce changes in behavior, but it is difficult to find clear patterns 
and interpret exactly what is happening. When I test for changes in the propensity to meet or beat 
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analysts’ forecasts after lawsuits, I find a general pattern of firms beating analysts’ estimates by 
larger margins, and shifting away from just meeting or beating by small amounts. It is not clear if 
this results from changes in earnings management, changes in the way that managers 
communicate and manage expectations, or both. It is also possible that observed changes in NSPI 
reporting or the propensity to meet or beat forecasts are really symptoms of some other 
unobserved factor(s). 
While lawsuits appear to affect firms’ propensity to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, it is 
also interesting to know if lawsuits change the manner in which firms manage earnings to meet 
expectations. Theoretically, managing earnings through real activities should involve less legal 
costs than managing through accruals, since real earnings management does not involve 
actionable fraud unless a manager makes misleading public statements. In tests of real earnings 
management,  I find evidence that in many cases, both sued firms and their peers increase real 
earnings management after lawsuits, and this is strongest for lawsuits alleging GAAP violations 
and where the judicial opinion is highly cited. Thus it is possible that the trend of private GAAP 
lawsuits is pushing firms away from accruals-based earnings management and towards real 
earnings management. 
Finally, to better understand the consequences of the financial reporting changes that I 
observe, I also conduct tests of changes in stock return characteristics following lawsuits. If firms 
make changes to reduce their litigation risk, then I expect to see stock return characteristics 
consistent with this reduced risk. Large, sudden stock price declines are a critical determinant of 
litigation, so efforts to reduce future litigation risk should attempt to minimize the occurrence of 
such negative returns. To proxy for the likelihood of a sudden, sharp stock price decline, I use 
stock return volatility, stock return skewness, and the minimum 1-day stock return for each 
period. Prior literature has found significant relationships between these variables and litigation 
risk (e.g. Kim and Skinner, 2012). For sued firms and their industry peers, I generally find 
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significant changes that are sometimes consistent with successful reduction of litigation risk, but 
the results are not uniform. Shared auditor peers, however, show significant changes in stock 
return patterns consistent with increased litigation risk. These auditor peer firms generally display 
significantly higher stock return volatility and larger minimum daily stock declines.  
This study provides contributions to multiple streams of literature. First, my findings are 
important to the literature and debate on accounting standard-setting. I highlight how U.S. GAAP 
exists inside of our common law judicial system, where private disputes and judicial decisions 
outside of the control of standard-setting bodies can shape the future implementation of GAAP. 
This fact should play a role in important debates about accounting standards. For example, some 
parties argue that accounting standards should focus on a valuation function, while others argue 
for a stewardship/performance-evaluation function. The former function calls for more fair value 
accounting, while the latter requires more conservatism and verifiability (Kothari, Ramanna, & 
Skinner, 2010). My results show that in some areas, notably revenue recognition, the U.S. legal 
system pushes managers toward conservatism and verifiability, but this can dramatically vary 
based on the outcome of the case. Other results leave open the possibility that litigation may 
make firms less likely to report negative special items, implying that the legal system may 
sometimes hinder a goal of conservatism. These findings emphasize the importance of legal 
institutions in fashioning accounting standards, and also have implications for issues of 
convergence. Even if full convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP were achieved, the unique 
U.S. system of private litigation could lead to substantial variation in implementation between the 
U.S and other countries, and even within the U.S. This role of the judicial system in GAAP is not 
fully recognized by standard-setters, practitioners, or judges, making the design and enforcement 
of accounting standards less effective than it might be. 
 Similarly, this study contributes to the literature on financial reporting and legal 
institutions, illustrating how legal rules shape managers’ reporting choices, often in unexpected 
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ways.  The increased focus on GAAP violations in private litigation was not an intended goal of 
the PSLRA.  Choi et al. (2009) show that this shift is not merely the result of filtering out of 
meritless cases, because many cases that might have resulted in substantial settlements in the pre-
PSLRA period are now dismissed or no longer brought if they lack “hard evidence” such as a 
restatement.  My results are a first step in understanding the consequences of this shift towards 
accounting-focused cases.  
 Finally, this study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of class action litigation 
under Rule 10b-5. Ostensibly, the private right to sue under Rule 10b-5 is intended to provide 
compensation to shareholders harmed by deceptive statements. However, Rule 10b-5 arguably 
does a poor job of compensating victims, since any settlements paid to defrauded shareholders are 
at least partially paid by the current shareholders. In this study, I show that while lawsuits may 
not adequately compensate defrauded shareholders, in some cases they might at least provide 
current and future shareholders of sued firms the benefit of improved financial reporting. But in 
other cases financial reporting may get worse, compounding the problem. In the absence of 
effective compensation, the utility of Rule 10b-5 rests on its effectiveness as a deterrent against 
future misbehavior. From this perspective, I provide evidence on areas where class actions appear 
to deter the type of behavior that they target, areas where they have no effect, and areas where 
they could actually encourage undesirable behavior. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Legal Context 
 Uniquely in the United States, private actors play an outsized role in the enforcement of 
securities laws. The chief legal rule under which most anti-fraud litigation occurs is known as 
Rule 10b-5. This rule was promulgated by the SEC under the authority of the 1934 Exchange Act 
and broadly prohibits, among other things, the making of “any untrue statement of a material 
fact” or the omission of “a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made…not 
misleading” (17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5). Subsequent judicial interpretations of the rule allow private 
shareholders to enforce it through class action litigation. In practice, litigation is generally 
initiated and conducted by professional plaintiff’s law firms rather than shareholders. Plaintiff’s 
lawyers watch the market and attempt to identify cases where the potential damages and 
likelihood of success create high expected payoffs.  
In order to satisfy the elements of a successful 10b-5 claim, plaintiffs will generally 
require a large stock price drop following the revelation to the market that the firm has made 
misleading statements or omissions. For example, a firm may announce strong sales and earnings, 
then later announce that they are restating earnings because the earlier sales numbers were based 
on improperly recognized revenue. If the latter announcement is accompanied by a sharp stock 
price decline, then plaintiffs can more easily show that the false statements were material and 
caused losses to investors. Anyone who purchased stock during the time that the price was 
artificially inflated is eligible to be a member of the class represented in the lawsuit.  
Worried that plaintiffs’ attorneys would sue large publicly-traded firms any time there 
was a significant stock price decline and then use the costly discovery process to “fish” for 
possible violations, Congress passed the PSLRA in 1995, even overriding a veto by President 
Clinton. The PSLRA aimed to filter out meritless lawsuits at an early stage by imposing strict 
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requirements on the complaint that is filed to initiate the lawsuit. Most important of these 
requirements was that the plaintiffs provide “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference” that the sued managers acted with scienter.  (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)). Scienter is 
defined as a “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” (Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 1976). Early in the litigation, defendants generally file a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that the plaintiffs have failed to meet the PSLRA standards. Plaintiffs are not allowed to request 
internal documents or depositions from the firm until a judge decides whether the PSLRA 
requirements have been met. Therefore plaintiffs must create a strong inference of scienter 
primarily using publicly available information. If the judge determines they have not established 
this inference, the case will be dismissed. On the other hand, if the case survives dismissal it will 
almost always settle.   
One method that plaintiffs quickly seized upon was to increasingly focus on cases where 
they could allege a violation of GAAP. While "the mere publication of inaccurate accounting 
figures, or a failure to follow GAAP, without more, does not establish scienter” (Fine v. 
American Solar King Corp., 1990), many courts have held that “when combined with other 
circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent, however, allegations of improper accounting may 
support a strong inference of scienter” (Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp, 
1996). For example, in a class action against Accredo Health, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that 
Accredo’s managers deceived the market when they reported strong earnings but failed to write 
down a large amount of doubtful accounts receivables of an acquired company. The plaintiffs 
successfully alleged facts creating a strong inference of scienter by noting that the Accredo 
managers had been part of the due diligence process in acquiring the company and also received 
regular reports concerning outstanding accounts receivables. Therefore it was likely they knew 
the accounts should have been written down in accordance with GAAP. 
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Table 1 shows that the number and proportion of lawsuits with GAAP allegations 
increased dramatically starting in 1996, the first year the PSLRA became effective (See Appendix 
for all tables).1 Table 2 shows the settlement rate for Non-GAAP and GAAP cases. GAAP cases 
have settled at a higher rate in each year of the post-PSLRA period, indicating why plaintiffs have 
continued this trend. Prior literature confirms that GAAP allegations are associated with a 
significantly higher probability of settlement even after controlling for other potential 
determinants of outcome (Cutler et al. 2014). Similarly, Johnson et al. (2007) find that a 
restatement increases the likelihood of lawsuits and settlements. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
GAAP lawsuits in my sample by two-digit SIC industry and year. While some industries clearly 
attract more litigation than others and individual industries sometime experience spikes in certain 
years, lawsuits are spread over a wide variety of industries and occur relatively evenly over time.  
 
 
Review of Prior Literature 
While prior literature provides convincing evidence that improper accounting behavior 
can be an important determinant of the cases that are brought to court and the cases that settle, we 
know less about how litigation affects subsequent accounting behavior. Jennings, Kedia, and 
Rajgopal (2014) provide the most relevant evidence. In a study examining the effectiveness of 
SEC enforcement actions on the earnings quality of peer firms, they show that private lawsuits 
are actually more effective than SEC actions at increasing earnings quality in terms of abnormal 
accruals, conservatism, and informativeness. As they are primarily interested in deterrence 
effects, they do not study changes in the sued firms themselves. They also exclude non-GAAP 
                                                          
1 I note that there appears to be a reverse in the trend in the final years of Table 1, as 2010 and 2011 contain 
a markedly lower percentage of GAAP lawsuits. This reversal appears to be a temporary blip, however, as 
Cornerstone Research reports that 45 cases with accounting allegations were ultimately reported in 2012, 
47 in 2013, and 69 in 2014. In addition, the 2014 cases with accounting allegations constituted 70 percent 
of all the cases that settled and 85 percent of settlement dollars. (Cornerstone Research, 2015). 
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lawsuits from their sample, and do not consider the outcome of the lawsuits. Rogers and Van 
Buskirk (2009) study voluntary disclosure changes among all sued firms and show that litigation 
can change their subsequent behavior, finding a decrease in the quantity and quality of voluntary 
disclosure relative to non-sued firms. It is not clear whether or how these voluntary disclosure 
changes might be related to changes in accounting. Lennox and Li (2014) find that lawsuits with 
auditor defendants lead to a decreased probability that the auditor’s other clients will have a 
future restatement, especially clients in the same audit office. Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo (2010) 
show that lawsuits can lead to increased board independence, especially when an institutional 
investor served as lead plaintiff.   
Other studies link ex ante litigation risk to financial reporting behavior. Hopkins (2012) 
shows that an exogenous decrease in litigation risk for a subset of firms was followed by 
increased discretionary revenues and a greater likelihood of restatements. Conversely, Alam and 
Petruska (2012) show that a temporary increase in litigation risk was accompanied by a 
temporary increase in conservatism.  Similarly, Qiang (2007) finds that conservatism is 
significantly greater for firms with higher litigation risk. Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2014) show 
that Director and Officer (D&O) liability insurance premiums are higher for firms with 
restatements or low quality earnings.  These studies support a prediction that conservatism and 
earnings quality should increase after lawsuits. 
Similar to my study, Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler (2012a) classify the specific 
GAAP standards cited in a large sample of lawsuits involving alleged GAAP violations. Their 
purpose is to test whether rules-based or principles-based standards are more likely to lead to 
litigation and whether the type of standard affects the litigation outcome. They find that the 
accounting standards involved in litigation tend to be more principles-based, but they find no 
results with respect to the outcome of litigation. While they do not directly disclose the frequency 
of different GAAP allegations, they do provide unranked lists of the ten most commonly 
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appearing standards in different subsamples, and their lists are consistent with my findings below. 
While Donelson et al. (2012a) shows how accounting standards matter in what suits are brought 
to court, my focus is how firms’ accounting choices change after a lawsuit. Indeed, this contrast 
applies to prior literature more generally. Prior literature often views private litigation as a fixed 
risk faced by firms, but I view litigation as an evolving and interactive process leading to 
continual incremental change in financial reporting.  
Another branch of prior research provides evidence on characteristics of firms that are 
sued. Kellogg (1984) shows that litigation is more common when accounts are overstated rather 
than understated.  Relatedly, there is evidence that conservatism reduces the likelihood of 
litigation. (Blunck, 2009; Ettredge, Huang, & Zhang 2012; Donelson, McInnis, Mergenthaler, & 
Yu, 2012b).  Chalmers, Naiker, and Navissi (2012) find that the earnings quality of sued firms 
prior to lawsuits is significantly poorer than non-sued firms. If litigation is effective, then these 
studies suggest conservatism and earnings quality may increase following lawsuits. However, 
some tension arises from the model of Laux and Stocken (2012), which predicts that under some 
conditions, expected legal penalties may actually cause managers to increase misreporting. 
Other studies involve the connection between restatements and litigation. As noted, 
restatements have been shown to be an important factor for plaintiffs in choosing which cases to 
pursue (Johnson, et al., 2007; Choi, et al., 2009). Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 
restatements involving recurring items or multiple accounts are more likely to lead to litigation, 
and Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) find that restatements that result from irregularities and not 
merely errors are more likely to result in lawsuits. There are also studies that examine the 
consequences of restatements, without distinguishing firms that experienced lawsuits. Ettredge, 
Huang, and Zhang (2013) find that restatement firms subsequently stop issuing forecasts or issue 
fewer forecasts, and forecasts issued are less precise. Wilson (2008) finds a loss of information 
content to earnings after a restatement, but shows that the information loss is temporary. Ettredge 
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et al. (2013) shows an increase in conservatism after restatements, but only when the restatement 
precipitates governance changes. Despite any consequences to firms who restate, Files, Sharp, 
and Thompson (2013) document that a large proportion of restatement firms restate again in the 
future.  
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 I theorize that the manner and extent of a manager’s reaction to a lawsuit will be a 
function of a) the firm’s “proximity” or similarity to the sued firm and b) the amount of new 
information provided by the lawsuit. I consider a non-sued firm to be proximate to a sued firm if 
it is in the same industry and size decile as the sued firm, or if it shares an auditor and geographic 
proximity with the sued firm. These are the firms which are most likely to pay attention to the 
lawsuit, and where mechanisms most likely exist to transmit information between firms. For 
example, when firms share an auditor, the auditor can take information learned in a lawsuit 
against one client and transmit it to other clients. For industry peers, information can be shared 
through mediums such as trade organizations, interlocking boards, etc. To capture the amount of 
new information in a lawsuit, I use the number of citations to the judge’s opinion on the motion to 
dismiss. This is nearly always the most important and dispositive opinion in this type of case. If 
the decision is novel because it addresses a new fact situation or applies the law in a new way, it 
creates new precedent and should generate a greater number of citations. These are the cases 
theoretically most likely to cause revision or updating of managers’ beliefs about what actions 
will or will not lead to litigation. 
After each lawsuit observed, managers might react in several alternative ways. The 
simplest alternative is that firms could do nothing. If a lawsuit occurs in an industry that is 
dissimilar to the managers’ own, then the managers can reasonably conclude that a similar 
financial reporting situation will not arise and lead to litigation in their own firm. Or, if there is no 
readily available mechanism to transmit the information in the lawsuit to the non-sued managers, 
they are unlikely to change their behavior. In addition, if the lawsuit itself does not provide much 
new information, for example if the circumstances and outcome of the lawsuit are very similar to 
prior litigation, then the managers have little reason to change their previously optimal behavior.    
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However, if the lawsuit is more proximate to the non-sued firm, and/or provides more 
new information, then it is more likely that managers will change their financial accounting and 
reporting behavior in some way. Findings of prior literature outlined above support this 
prediction. Most notably, Rogers and VanBuskik (2009) show evidence that sued firms change 
disclosure behavior after lawsuits and Jennings, et al. (2014) show that industry peers of firms 
sued for GAAP allegations exhibit changes in earnings properties. Given a prediction that firms 
will change their financial accounting behavior in response to lawsuits, there are still two 
different general possibilities for what form this change could take. In both cases, firms will act in 
ways designed to reduce the risk of facing litigation in the future. First, firms could respond 
directly to the allegations in the lawsuit. For example, if a lawsuit alleges that revenue was 
recognized prematurely, then firms might respond by recognizing revenue more slowly, or if a 
lawsuit alleges that a firm failed to recognize a goodwill impairment, firms might respond by 
recognizing impairments more quickly and more often in the future. This is the type of response 
that would be desirable from a policy perspective.  
I predict that firms will respond directly to the allegations of the lawsuit when doing so 
will unambiguously reduce their litigation risk. Specifically, I predict that firms should respond 
directly to revenue recognition lawsuits by reducing discretionary revenues. If a firm faces 
litigation for an aggressive revenue recognition practice, and especially if a firm pays a 
significant settlement, that firm and its peer firms have a clear incentive to avoid similar types of 
revenue recognition practices in the future. Once a judge determines that a specific pattern of 
improper revenue recognition creates a strong inference of scienter, future managers who engage 
in similar behavior are inviting litigation. Managers may worry that more conservative revenue 
recognition will make it harder to meet earnings expectations, and an earnings miss could also 
increase litigation risk. However, managers have many different methods available to them to 
meet or beat expectations. As new case law makes aggressive revenue recognition comparatively 
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more expensive, they should be able to reduce discretionary revenues and shift towards other 
methods in order to unambiguously reduce litigation risk. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1A: Class action lawsuits alleging revenue recognition violations are associated with 
significantly lower discretionary revenues for sued firms and their industry and shared auditor 
peers. 
 
It is difficult to predict precisely how firms will respond to asset impairment recognition 
lawsuits. They could respond directly by recognizing impairments in full as soon as they are 
likely. But paradoxically, this could actually increase litigation risk. Many firms are sued for 
failure to timely recognize an asset impairment only after they have actually recognized it. A 
large write-down triggers a stock price decline, and plaintiffs sue claiming that the impairment 
should have been recognized earlier. This is precisely the fact pattern that occurred in the 
Accredo Health example above. Therefore, quickly recognizing impairments may not 
unambiguously reduce litigation risk. A manager may rationally choose to delay the impairment 
in the hope that the situation improves or that some good news arises that he can pair with the 
write-down to soften the blow. An alternate strategy might be to recognize impairments in 
smaller increments over time in order to avoid sudden stock price drops. Because I do not have a 
clear prediction, I state my hypothesis in the null form. 
 
H20: Class action lawsuits alleging failures to recognize asset impairments are not associated 
with changes in the reporting of negative special items for sued firms and their industry and 
shared auditor peers. 
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Rather than, or in addition to, responding directly to the allegations in a lawsuit, 
managers could take other actions designed to reduce litigation risk. These would presumably be 
actions that reduce the likelihood of large stock price drops, such as avoiding abrupt releases of 
negative news and striving to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. Many lawsuits are triggered by 
a failure to meet earnings estimates, followed by a sharp stock price decline. As noted, plaintiffs 
generally require such a stock price decline so that they can demonstrate that investors suffered 
losses and that the losses were connected to the sued firm’s disclosures. My sample shows the 
importance of earnings misses in triggering litigation. Approximately 59% of sued firms in the 
sample failed to meet analysts’ estimates in the quarter of the lawsuit or one of the prior four 
quarters. For non-sued firms, there is an earnings miss over a similar time period only 21% of the 
time. Therefore, it is possible that managers respond to lawsuits by changing their propensity to 
meet or beat analysts’ estimates. Since an earnings miss can trigger a lawsuit, managers may 
logically increase their efforts to meet or beat expectations. However, it is also possible that 
managers could decrease efforts to meet expectations since firms that routinely miss estimates 
may experience less severe stock price declines after each miss. 
Because I do not have clear predictions about the direction of changes in the propensity 
to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, I state my hypotheses in the null form: 
 
H30: Class action lawsuits alleging GAAP violations are not associated with the propensity of 
sued firms and their industry and shared auditor peers to meet or beat analyst expectations in the 
future. 
 
 If managers do continue or increase efforts to manage earnings in order to meet 
expectations, they may change the means by which they do so.  Since private litigation is often 
focused on violations of GAAP, managers may shift away from accruals-based earnings 
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management towards real earnings management. Earnings management through real activities 
should theoretically involve less litigation risk. First, it does not necessarily mislead shareholders, 
so long as managers do not publicly lie about real earnings management activities, and therefore 
it is not illegal in terms of Rule 10b-5. Second, even if some form of improper real earnings 
management occurred, it would be difficult for plaintiffs to detect and allege. Cohen, et al. (2008) 
show that in another setting, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, when accruals-based earnings 
management became relatively more costly, firms shifted towards management through real 
activities. I expect private litigation targeting GAAP violations to have a similar effect. 
Accordingly, I predict that GAAP lawsuits will increase the real earnings management of sued 
firms and their peers. 
 
 H4A: Class action lawsuits alleging GAAP violations are associated with a significant increase in 
real earnings management by sued firms and their industry and shared auditor peers. 
 
If managers make financial accounting and reporting changes in an effort to reduce 
litigation risk, then it is logical to ask whether these efforts are successful.  Plaintiffs have a much 
greater ability to succeed in Rule 10b-5 class actions when there are sudden stock price declines 
that can be tied to managers’ disclosures or other financial reporting events, so successful 
reduction of litigation risk should lower the likelihood of a sharp stock price drop. To measure the 
likelihood of a large stock price drop, I use stock return volatility, the negative skewness of stock 
returns, and the size of the minimum 1-day return each quarter. If a manager takes actions to 
successfully reduce litigation risk, then I expect reduced stock return volatility, less negatively-
skewed stock returns, and less severe one-day stock price declines.  Each new lawsuit may update 
managers’ beliefs about a) the likelihood of future litigation and b) how judges will weigh stock 
return behavior in making key decisions. This new information may justify any costs of taking 
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actions to better manage the firm’s stock price movements. For example, only last year the 
Supreme Court resolved confusion and disagreement as to the role of stock price patterns when 
deciding whether to allow cases to proceed as class actions, providing increased incentives for 
managers to carefully manage stock price movements (Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc., 2014).2 Still, it is not clear that new cases will uniformly cause managers to increase 
litigation risk-reduction efforts since a new case can cause managers to revise their expectations 
about the probability of litigation either upwards or downwards. In addition, other actions that 
managers may take in response to litigation, such as changes in revenue recognition or special 
item reporting, could have indirect effects on the firm’s stock price. Therefore I state a hypothesis 
in the null form: 
H50: Stock return volatility, stock return skewness, and the size of minimum 1-day stock returns 
will not be significantly different following litigation for for sued firms and their industry and 
shared auditor peers. 
 
 It is also likely that any associated changes observed following litigation can depend on 
the outcome of lawsuits. If a lawsuit is filed but later dismissed, managers may feel that they can 
engage in similar behavior in the future because plaintiffs are unlikely to attempt another lawsuit 
based on the losing fact pattern. On the other hand, a dismissed lawsuit may provoke extra fear 
within managers since they now see that a firm may face litigation even when it has not 
necessarily done anything wrong.  
                                                          
2 Early in litigation process, a court must decide whether to “certify a class” or allow all potential plaintiffs 
to be included in one large lawsuit, rather than many smaller ones. To succeed, plaintiffs must show, 
among other things, that there is sufficient commonality across all class members on a number of key 
issues, one of which is reliance. Traditionally, courts have essentially waived the reliance requirement if the 
issuer’s shares are traded on an efficient market, since investors are presumed to rely on the integrity of the 
market price, which should incorporate all material statements by managers. However, in Halliburton II, 
the Supreme Court held that defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification 
stage by showing that their statements had no stock price impact. 
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If a lawsuit is not dismissed, but instead results in a substantial settlement paid to the 
plaintiffs, managers may similarly be more or less likely to make financial accounting changes in 
the future. A large settlement is an objectively worse outcome for a sued firm than having the 
case dismissed, so settled lawsuits may be more salient to managers of the sued firm and peer 
firms. More importantly, when a judge decides that a particular fact pattern constitutes a strong 
inference of scienter, plaintiffs may be more vigilant for similar situations in the future, and 
managers will have strong incentives to avoid such behavior. Alternatively, managers may 
believe that settlements result from outlier firms behaving egregiously and fraudulently, and so 
they could make fewer changes since they already eschew fraudulent behavior.   
Another possibility is that there are no differential effects based on outcome. Managers 
may view outcomes as idiosyncratic, unpredictable decisions of judges. In addition, all or part of 
a settlement may be paid by an insurance provider rather than out of managers’ pockets, so the 
differential impact of settlements on managers’ behavior could be minimal.  
 Accordingly, I state my hypothesis related to outcome in the null: 
H60:  The outcome of class action lawsuits alleging GAAP violations does not have a significant 
differential effect on any observed effects for sued firms and their industry and shared auditor 
peers. 
 
 Finally, as discussed above, managers should react more to lawsuits when they provide 
more new information. A lawsuit will provide the most new information when it deals with a 
previously unaddressed fact pattern or requires interpretation of a particular area of law for the 
first time. These novel cases should generally result in judicial opinions that are cited more often 
by later judges and practitioners in their own opinions and court documents. Therefore, I predict 
that more highly-cited cases will result in stronger reactions:  
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H7A: Any observed effects related to class action lawsuits alleging GAAP violations will be 
increasing in the number of subsequent citations of that lawsuit’s judicial opinion(s). 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Data and Sample 
 I obtain data on securities class actions since 1983 from the Securities Class Action 
Service (SCAS) by Institutional Shareholder Services. This dataset contains a variable, 
GAAP_YN, indicating whether the lawsuit contains allegations of GAAP violations. To classify 
the specific GAAP allegation in each case, I obtain the lawsuit complaint from the Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), and search the allegations. Due to the time-
intensive nature of this step, I limit the sample to lawsuits filed within the ten-year period 1996-
2005. This results in 395 class actions with GAAP allegations. Of these, 32 do not have a 
complaint available in SCAC, and my examination of complaints reveals that another 39 do not 
actually contain GAAP allegations. There are 83 cases where no specific GAAP standard is cited, 
but I still attempt to classify the allegations if a GAAP violation is sufficiently articulated.  
Table 4 summarizes my classification of GAAP allegations. Rather than classify solely 
by specific standards within GAAP, I organize the allegations into categories where possible. The 
largest category consists of improper revenue recognition, with 182 cases. The next largest 
category is 153 cases with allegations that the firm violated SFAS 5 by failing to accrue an 
adequate contingent liability/loss3. However, the majority of these cases occur in conjunction 
with a revenue recognition violation. For example, firms alleged to have improperly booked 
revenue are often also accused of failing to accrue adequate losses for uncollectible accounts 
receivable or sales returns sure to result from the questionable revenues. The next category 
consists of 81 cases where the firm allegedly failed to recognize an impairment and write-down 
assets in a timely manner. Frequently, these lawsuits result after the firm has made such an 
                                                          
3 Note that the number of cases listed in SFAS 5 subcategories sums to more than 153 because some cases 
contain multiple allegations. 
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impairment, and the plaintiffs allege that the sued managers knew the asset was impaired much 
earlier and improperly delayed taking action. The largest group within this category relate to 
failure to report inventory at lower of cost or market, and another large group relates to the 
impairment of goodwill or other intangible assets. Beyond these large categories, Table 4 lists a 
variety of smaller groups. A common thread through the large majority of cases is that firms 
attempt to increase reported net income in order to meet earnings expectations, either by 
increasing revenues or decreasing expenses.  
Donelson et al. (2012a) also classify the GAAP provisions cited in private litigation and 
the provisions that they report are consistent with Table 4. Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) 
classify the categories of accounting fraud in companies with SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases. While their categorization scheme does not map directly to mine, the 
categories appear largely consistent with what I find in the private litigation sample.  
It is interesting to note that most private lawsuits tend to concentrate on a few small areas 
of GAAP. This could indicate that these areas are the most problematic and are violated the most, 
and standard-setters and enforcers should pay careful attention to these areas. It could also mean 
that these are the areas that best enable plaintiffs’ attorneys to successfully win settlements. The 
sample of SEC actions in Bonner et al. (1998) contains similar categories as in my sample, but 
the cases appear somewhat less skewed towards the largest few areas. Private plaintiffs require 
violations that can be directly linked to material movements in stock price, and that they can 
identify using publicly available information.  If most areas of GAAP do not fit these 
requirements, they may be relatively under-enforced. 
For my main tests, I focus on two of the largest three categories that provide a sufficient 
number of cases for study, improper revenue recognition and failure to recognize asset 
impairments. As noted, I do not use the improper contingent reserves allegations because they are 
too difficult to disentangle from, and are usually derivative of, revenue recognition allegations. I 
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also run tests focusing on the entire group of GAAP cases, and in all tests I also include all non-
GAAP cases for comparison.  
To construct my main sample, I merge the lawsuit data with all quarterly Compustat data 
over the sample period. I use quarterly data since my dependent variables generally require it. I 
am interested in changes related to the lawsuit, so I create indicator variables based on time 
periods before a lawsuit is filed and after a lawsuit is resolved.  Pre_sued equals 1 for a sued firm 
in the eight quarters prior to the filing of a lawsuit, Post_settle equals 1 in the eight quarters after 
a settlement is first announced, and Post_dismiss equals 1 in the eight quarters after a lawsuit is 
dismissed. I include very small, “nuisance” settlements, which I define as less than or equal to 0.5 
percent of market capitalization, in the dismissal category.  
Similarly, I create analogous variables Pre_ind_sued, Post_ind_settle, and 
Post_ind_dismiss for non-sued firms in the same industry, measured as two-digit SIC code, and 
market decile as a sued firm, and Pre_aud_sued, Post_aud_settle, and Post_aud_dismiss for all 
non-sued firms who share the same auditor in the relevant quarter(s). Given the relatively small 
number of auditing firms, I would not have sufficient variation in my sample without narrowing 
the matching procedure, since some client of each big N auditor is sued in most years. Therefore I 
also require the shared auditor peer firm to have some geographic proximity to the sued firm. A 
geographically proximate firm is also more likely to share an audit office with the sued firm, so 
transmission of information learned through litigation should be more likely. To proxy for 
geographic proximity I require the shared auditor peer firm to be headquartered in the same 
federal judicial circuit as the sued firm. The federal judicial circuit map conveniently divides the 
United States into 11 regions, similar to U.S. Census regions. 
I next create similar indicator variables related to the attributes and allegations of the 
lawsuits. Pre_GAAP_settle and Pre_GAAP_dimiss are equal to 1 in the eight quarters before a 
firm is sued for alleged GAAP violations, and Post_GAAP_settle and Post_GAAP_dismiss are 
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equal to 1 in the eight quarters after the lawsuit is settled or dismissed, respectively. For specific 
revenue recognition and asset impairment write-down allegations, the analogous variables are 
Pre_revrec_suit, Pre_writedown_suit, etc.  Each of these variables also has industry and shared 
auditor peer equivalents.  
I also create indicator variables capturing when the auditor is included as a defendant in 
the lawsuit, with Pre_auditor_def equal to 1 in the eight quarters prior to a lawsuit and 
Post_auditor_def equal to one in the eight quarters following the resolution of the case. I include 
this auditor variable for two reasons. First, it signals that the alleged GAAP violations were 
substantial and serious, and second, auditors who are sued may have extra incentives to change 
the future behavior of their clients. The inclusion of an auditor is relatively rare. Of the 581 total 
lawsuits with sufficient data for my tests, only 34 include an audit firm as a defendant, and often 
the auditor may be dismissed from the case early. Two major factors probably contribute to the 
dearth of auditors during the sample period. First, a 1994 Supreme Court decision made it 
considerably more difficult to find auditors liable for Rule 10b-5 violations, holding that plaintiffs 
must show that auditors did not merely aid and abet the violation by managers, but actually made 
actionable statements or omissions themselves, with scienter (Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver). In addition, after the PSLRA, auditors in many cases are no 
longer jointly and severally liable for the entire damages amount, but are only responsible for the 
amount that they proportionately caused. When an auditor is sued, though, the lawsuits 
overwhelmingly settle. Of the 34 lawsuits with auditor defendants in the sample, only 4 were 
dismissed4. Many of the auditor cases in the sample are clustered around the Enron-era large 
accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s. To allege scienter for auditors, plaintiffs 
                                                          
4 In my dataset, a case is considered settled if any defendant agrees to a settlement, so it is quite possible 
and even likely that in the 30 auditor cases that settled, the auditors themselves may have been dismissed 
from the case. 
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may use facts such as non-audit consulting services provided by the audit firm that created a 
conflict of interest, or obvious red flags of which the auditor must have been aware. 
To measure the number of citations to a judicial decision in each GAAP lawsuit, I use the 
Shepard’s service of LexisNexis. For each case, I count the number of citations in future judicial 
opinions, including any appellate decisions, as well as court documents such as motions to 
dismiss. I scale the number of citations by the number of years passed since the lawsuit was filed, 
so that there is no bias towards older cases which have had more time to collect citations. I then 
take the natural log of the sum of the citations per year for each case to create the variables Cites, 
Ind_cites, and Aud_cites associated with each case. In my tests, I interact these citation variables 
with the GAAP, revenue recognition, and write-down variables. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 To test for changes related to revenue recognition, I use the Stubben (2010) measure of 
discretionary revenues. While there are many competing discretionary accrual measures 
available, discretionary revenues is most directly suited to the type of behavior commonly 
encountered in sued firms. This measure is designed to capture how quickly a firm recognizes 
revenue relative to its peers. In multiple tests, Stubben (2010) shows that his measure of 
discretionary revenues performs better than the Dechow-Dichev measure of discretionary 
accruals or the modified Jones model at detecting revenue manipulation. Discretionary revenues, 
DiscRev, is defined as the residual from the following regression, estimated by industry and year: 
(ARi,q + ARi,q-1 + ARi,q-2 + ARi,q-3) - ( ARi,q-4 + ARi,q-5 + ARi,q-6 + ARi,q-7) =α + β1(REVi,q - REVi,q-4) 
+ β2[(REVi,q-1 + REVi,q-2 + REVi,q-3) - (REVi,q-5 + REVi,q-6 + REVi,q-7)] + ɛ 
Where AR is net accounts receivable of firm i in quarter q as measured from the statement of cash 
flows, and revenue is total revenues of firm i in quarter q.  
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Since this method models receivables, the accrual most directly related to revenue, it 
contains less noise and bias than models of aggregate accruals. The model takes a conservative 
approach by modeling receivables as a function of reported revenues and not cash revenues, 
which should understate rather than overstate the estimate of discretionary revenues. Finally, by 
separating the revenue components of the model into the change in revenues from the first three 
quarters and the change in revenue in the fourth quarter, the model is less likely to under- or 
overestimate discretion. This is because revenues reported in the later part of the year are less 
likely to be collected in cash by the end of the year, even if they are completely legitimate, and 
firms with abnormally high or low fourth quarter revenue could therefore have biased estimates 
of discretionary revenue. 
 To test for changes related to impairments/write-offs, I examine the probability of 
reporting negative special items (NSPI) each quarter, as well as the size of NSPI reported scaled 
by income before special items. For each firm-quarter in my sample, NSPI_YN equals 1 if the 
firm reports a negative special item, and NSPI_size equals the amount of the negative special item 
divided by total income before extraordinary items, and multiplied by negative one so that a 
larger coefficient will represent a larger NSPI in terms of absolute magnitude. In NSPI_size tests, 
I only include observations where nonzero NSPI was reported so that the results are more distinct 
from the propensity to report NSPI tests using NSPI_YN. 
 To measure firms’ propensity to meet or beat analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts, I 
create  an indicator variable, LMB_YN equal to 1 if a firm’s reported earnings for the quarter 
exceed by more than $0.03 the average analyst forecast as reported in I/B/E/S, and SMB_YN  
equal to 1 if a firm’s reported earnings for the quarter exceed the average analyst forecast by 
$0.03 or less. Consistently meeting or beating by a few cents is often used by prior literature as a 
proxy indicating a greater likelihood of earnings management. (e.g. Matsumoto, 2002; 
Burgstahler & Eames, 2006).   
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For tests of real earnings management, I use four measures based on Roychowdury 
(2006) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008). The first is a measure of abnormal cash flows from 
operations, Abnorm_CFO. This is designed to capture firms who accelerate the timing of sales 
through incentives to buyers such as price discounts and lenient credit terms, increasing current 
period earnings but decreasing current CFO. Therefore firms with earnings managed by this 
method should have a significantly negative coefficient on Abnorm_CFO. This measure is 
calculated by subtracting the actual operating cash flows (CFO) from the expected CFO 
calculated using the estimated coefficients from the following regression, run by industry and 
year:  
CFOit /Assetsi,t-1 = k1t (1/ Assetsi,t-1) + k2(Salesit / Assetsi,t-1) + k3(Δ Salesit / Assetsi,t-1) + εit. 
The next measure is abnormal production costs, Abnorm_prod. Managers can increase 
earnings by producing more units than necessary, spreading fixed costs over a greater number of 
units and therefore lowering the cost per unit. While decreasing COGS and increasing operating 
margins, this strategy leads to higher overall production costs and lower cash flows from 
operations. Therefore firms using the method of real earnings management would be expected to 
have a significantly positive coefficient on Abnorm_prod. Production costs (Prod) are defined as 
the sum of COGS plus the change in inventories, the normal level is predicted from the estimated 
coefficients in the following regression, run by industry and year, and abnormal equals actual 
minus expected:  
Prodit /Assetsi,t-1 = k1t (1/ Assetsi,t-1) + k2(Salesit / Assetsi,t-1) + k3(Δ Salesit / Assetsi,t-1) +  
k3(Δ Salesi,t-1 / Assetsi,t-1) + εit. 
Next, I use a measure of abnormal discretionary expenses, Abnorm_disc_exp. This 
method of real earnings management is intuitive, as managers can reduce discretionary expenses 
in order to increase current period earnings and cash flows, at the potential cost of reduced long 
term earnings and cash flows. Therefore firms managing earnings with this method should have a 
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significantly negative value of Abnorm_disc_exp. This measure is calculated as the actual level of 
discretionary expenses (Disc_exp), defined as the sum of R&D expense and SG&A expense, 
minus the expected level of discretionary expense predicted using the estimated coefficients from 
the following regression, run by industry and year: 
Disc_exp it /Assetsi,t-1 = k1t (1/ Assetsi,t-1) + k2(Salesi,t-1 / Assetsi,t-1) + εit. 
 Finally, for tests of stock return characteristics, I use three different dependent variables 
derived from CRSP daily stock return data. I measure the standard deviation of stock returns each 
quarter, Std_ret, the skewness of stock returns each quarter, Skew_ret, and the minimum daily 
return each quarter, Min_ret. I note that Min_ret is measured as the actual minimum one-day 
return, so a positive coefficient would be desirable from a litigation risk-reduction perspective, 
indicating that the largest one day stock price decline was less negative relative to the period 
before the lawsuit.   
 
 
Regression Models 
 To test for changes in discretionary revenues and probability and size of NSPI, I run 
regressions of the following form: 
DepVari,q = β1 + β2Pre_settlei,q + β3Post_Settlei,q + β4Pre_dismissi,q + β5Post_dismissi,q + 
β6Pre_GAAP_settlei,q  + β7Post_GAAP_settlei,q   + β8Pre_GAAP_dismissi,q  + 
β9Post_GAAP_dismissi,q  + β10Pre_allegation_settlei,q  + β11Post_allegation_settlei,q + 
β12Pre_allegation_dismissi,q  +  β13Post_ allegation _dismissi,q + β14Pre_GAAP_settlei,q*Cites  + 
β15Post_GAAP_settlei,q*Cites   + β16Pre_GAAP_dismissi,q*Cites  + β17Post_GAAP_dismissi,q 
*Cites + β18Pre_allegation_settlei,q *Cites + β19Post_ allegation _settlei,q *Cites + 
β20Pre_allegation_dismissi,q *Cites +  β21Post_allegation_dismissi,q *Cites + β22Pre_auditor_defi,q 
+ β23Post_auditor_defi,q + ΣγkControlsk,i,q + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + ε i,q 
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where “allegation” refers to the specific GAAP allegation relevant to each regression, revrec or 
writedown. For revenue recognition tests, I run OLS regressions with DiscRev as the dependent 
variable. For asset impairment tests, I run logit regressions with NSPI_YN as the dependent 
variable and OLS regressions with NSPI_size as the dependent variable.  
For tests of changes in propensity to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, tests of real 
earnings management, and tests of stock return attributes, I run similar logit or OLS regressions, 
but without specific allegation variables: 
 
DepVari,q = β1 + β2Pre_settlei,q + β3Post_Settlei,q + β4Pre_dismissi,q + β5Post_dismissi,q + 
β6Pre_GAAP_settlei,q  + β7Post_GAAP_settlei,q   + β8Pre_GAAP_dismissi,q  + 
β9Post_GAAP_dismissi,q  + β10Pre_GAAP_settlei,q*Cites  + β11Post_GAAP_settlei,q*Cites   + 
β12Pre_GAAP_dismissi,q*Cites  + β13Post_GAAP_dismissi,q *Cites + β14Pre_auditor_defi,q + 
β15Post_auditor_defi,q + ΣγkControlsk,i,q + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + ε i,q 
 
where the dependent variable is LMB_YN, SMB_YN, Abnorm_CFO, Abnorm_Prod, 
Abnorm_disc_exp, Std_ret, Ret_skewness, or Min_ret.  
In all tests, Industry_FE represents industry fixed effects, Circuit_FE represents judicial 
circuit fixed effects, and Year_FE represents year fixed effects. Additionally, I cluster standard 
errors by two-digit SIC code and report robust standard errors. The same regressions are also 
performed with the equivalent industry and shared auditor peer variables.  
Controls represents a vector of control variables following similar regressions in prior 
literature. ROA is the return on assets of firm i in quarter q, measured as income before 
extraordinary items in quarter q divided by total assets in quarter q-1. Salesgrowth is sales in 
quarter q divided by sales in quarter q-4, scaled by total assets in quarter q. MTB is market value 
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of equity scaled by book value of equity of firm i in quarter q, and Size is the natural log of 
market value of equity of firm i in quarter q. Age is the number of years that firm i has appeared 
in Compustat as of quarter q. Leverage is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets of firm 
i in quarter q. Goodwill is the amount of goodwill reported on the balance sheet by firm i in 
quarter q, scaled by total assets, and Num_Analyst, the number of I/B/E/S analysts providing 
estimates for the firm. For tests of stock return characteristics, I include controls based on Bushee 
and Noe (2000): the standard deviation of the value-weighted market returns, Std_ret_mkt, the 
average trading volume for the firm scaled by shares outstanding, AveVol, dividends paid each 
quarter scaled by market value of equity, DP, and the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
to market value of equity, EP. Table 5 presents variable definitions for key variables.  
I am primarily interested in changes resulting from litigation. Therefore, after running 
each regression, I perform F-tests to see whether pre- and post-litigation coefficients are 
significantly different from one another. My tables present the difference in the coefficients, 
calculated as post minus pre, along with the P-value from the F-test of whether post-pre=0. 
  
31 
 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Discretionary Revenue Tests 
 Table 6 presents results from regressions of discretionary revenues, DiscRev. 
Interestingly, with respect to sued firms themselves, I find only very limited results. Although the 
sued firms should have the most egregious examples of aggressive revenue recognition before the 
onset of litigation, I only observe significant evidence of reduced discretionary revenues after 
dismissed lawsuits, with no significant incremental effects for lawsuits with revenue recognition 
or other GAAP allegations. It could be that by the time a lawsuit is filed, the aggressive positions 
of the sued firms have already started to unwind or unravel, so that the pre- and post-periods in 
my tests are not adequately capturing any changes that do occur.  
With industry peers of sued firms, however, I generally observe a significant decline in 
discretionary revenues surrounding lawsuits. This decline is associated with all lawsuits, 
regardless of the allegations, but is significantly incrementally stronger for revenue recognition 
lawsuits that result in settlements.  General GAAP allegation cases that settle and result in a 
greater number of citations also have a significant incremental negative effect on industry peers’ 
discretionary revenues.  This evidence indicates that managers pay attention to litigation against 
peers in their industry, including the specific allegations of each lawsuit, and change their 
behavior accordingly. For shared auditor peers, though, I find almost no significant reductions in 
discretionary revenues following lawsuits. Perhaps revenue recognition behavior targeted in 
lawsuits tends to be industry-specific, and therefore primarily affects only industry-wide 
behavior. For example, a case alleging improper revenue recognition on a long-term construction 
contract is less likely to change the behavior of firms in the pharmaceutical or retail sectors. 
While industry peers generally display reduced discretionary revenues in response to 
litigation, perhaps the most interesting finding is that for highly-cited GAAP cases that are 
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dismissed, and highly cited revenue recognition cases that settle, there is a significant positive 
incremental effect on discretionary revenues of industry peers. It may be that in these cases, a 
judicial opinion can create a form of safe harbor for firms going forward. An opinion is likely to 
be highly cited when it deals with a fact pattern or area of law not previously addressed. When 
discussing and deciding the case, the judges further define the contours of what will or won’t 
result survive dismissal, and therefore provide more certainty to managers going forward.  
Consider the earlier example of Accredo Health, Inc. In that case, the judge found that the 
allegations that managers knowingly failed to write down doubtful accounts receivable were 
sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter and survive dismissal. However, the judge also 
indicated that these allegations were only sufficient when combined with suspicious insider stock 
sales by the defendant managers. Other managers observing the case might conclude that they 
could engage in similar accounting behavior so long as they avoided suspicious stock sales.  
 
 
Negative Special Item Tests 
 Table 7 presents results from regressions of the likelihood and size of NSPI before and 
after private lawsuits. Note that NSPI_size has been multiplied by negative one so that a negative 
coefficient means that negative special items reported after a lawsuit are smaller in terms of 
absolute value. For sued firms, I only observe significant results in response to specific asset 
impairment allegations, and the effect depends strongly on the outcome of the case. Settlements 
in asset impairment cases are related to larger NSPI reported in the future, while the effect is 
opposite for dismissed cases. One interpretation of these results is that when litigation results in a 
settlement, it has a deterrent effect that causes the firm to be more likely to recognize an 
impairment in the future. But when the lawsuit is dismissed, the firm’s managers perceive that 
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recognizing an impairment can trigger litigation, even if they have not actually done anything 
wrong. Therefore they become less likely to recognize large NSPI in the future.  
For industry peers of sued firms, I observe significant changes in NSPI following 
lawsuits, but in varying directions that are not easy to interpret. For asset impairment recognition 
lawsuits, I find no significant incremental effects, regardless of whether a case is highly cited. 
Apparently peer firms do not pay close attention to such allegations or do not perceive them to 
apply beyond the sued firm.  For lawsuits without GAAP allegations that are dismissed, I find 
that industry peers more likely to report NSPI, but in smaller amounts. Perhaps dismissed 
lawsuits raise fears about facing meritless litigation, and firms therefore avoid writing down 
assets for fear of triggering a lawsuit. But paradoxically, after a lawsuit with GAAP allegations is 
dismissed, industry peers tend to recognize larger NSPI.  When and auditor is included as a 
defendant, the results are opposite, with industry peers becoming less likely to report NSPI but 
reporting in larger amounts when they do.   
For peer firms with shared auditors in the same geographic region, the only significant 
result associated with specific asset impairment allegations is a significant increase in the 
likelihood of reporting NSPI following dismissed cases that are highly cited. For general GAAP 
allegation lawsuits which result in settlements, I find a marginally significant increase in the 
likelihood of reporting NSPI, but the size of NSPI decreases when the settled GAAP case is more 
highly cited. Thus, there is a general pattern following GAAP settlements of a tendency to report 
NSPI more often but in smaller amounts. As noted, this would be consistent with a strategy to 
reduce litigation risk by avoiding large write-downs. Finally, as with industry peers, when an 
auditor is included as a defendant, shared auditor peers become significantly less likely to report 
NSPI.  
My results indicate that litigation can induce significant changes in NSPI reporting, but 
changes occur in varying directions that are sometimes difficult to interpret. One issue may be 
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that a manager responding to an asset impairment recognition lawsuit may make changes that do 
not show up in special items. For example, a firm with impaired inventory could recognize the 
impairment in cost of goods sold, rather than as a separate line item. Although further study is 
required to understand the direction of changes I observe, the results again show the importance 
of private legal actors in shaping how GAAP is implemented. 
 
 
Meeting or Beating Analysts’ Forecasts Tests 
Table 8 shows results of logit regressions of the likelihood of meeting or beating 
analyst’s forecasts with a side-by-side comparison of “large” beating by greater than $0.03, and 
“small” meeting or beating by $0.03 or less. With respect to sued firms, results are mixed. 
Lawsuits with GAAP allegations are associated with a significant increase in beating analysts’ 
estimates by a large margin, especially following settlements. In contrast, for lawsuits without 
GAAP allegations, sued firms become significantly less likely to exceed expectations following 
cases that settle, but show a marginally significant increase in small meeting or beating after 
dismissals. For lawsuits with auditor defendants, there is a significant shift away from small 
meeting or beating towards beating by a larger margin. 
For industry peers of sued firms, GAAP lawsuits increase the likelihood of large meeting 
or beating, while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of small meeting or beating. For 
lawsuits without GAAP allegations, there are no significant effects. And as before, I observe 
opposite effects for lawsuits with an auditor included as a defendant, with firms significantly 
more likely to just meet analyst expectations.  
For shared auditor peers, I observe a similar general pattern of an increasing in beating by 
a large margin and a decrease in meeting or beating by a small margin. But in contrast to industry 
peers, cases without GAAP allegations have a significant impact, and the number of citations is 
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generally insignificant. And once again, results when the auditor is included as a defendant run in 
the opposite direction.   
 As with results in the NSPI reporting tests, the results here show litigation inducing 
significant changes in manager behavior, but in varying directions. In general, besides the 
relatively small number of auditor defendant cases, litigation appears to decrease the likelihood of 
meeting or beating by a small margin. This is not necessarily consistent with a reduction in 
earnings management, though, as I also observe an increase in the likelihood of meeting by larger 
margins. Perhaps this indicates that managers are reducing the quality of their guidance to 
analysts, and/or providing excessively negative guidance to ensure that analysts’ expectations are 
sufficiently easy to surpass. This is consistent with the results of Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) 
who find that sued firms reduce the quality and quantity of their voluntary disclosure, including 
management guidance, following lawsuits. If this means that the market is less informed, then my 
results may hint at a negative side effect of private securities litigation. 
 
 
Real Earnings Management Tests 
 If sued firms and their peers are in at least some cases reducing aggressive accounting 
behavior in response to litigation, but also sometimes maintaining or increasing their tendency to 
meet earnings targets, then a logical next question is by what means they are continuing to 
manage earnings. When managers observe that aggressive accounting practices can increase the 
likelihood of lawsuits and settlements, they may rationally shift to earnings management through 
real activities. Indeed, Cohen et al. (2008) find that after Sarbanes-Oxley cracked down on 
accounting improprieties, there was a shift away from accruals-based earnings management and 
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towards real earnings management. I test for a similar pattern following private litigation 
targeting GAAP violations. 
Table 9 presents results of regressions of measures of real earnings management. For 
sued firms themselves, there is significant evidence of increased real earnings management 
following highly-cited GAAP settlements and auditor litigation, in terms of abnormal CFO and 
abnormal production costs.  But abnormal discretionary expenses actually increase, inconsistent 
with real earnings management.  
For peer firms, I also observe significant increases in real earnings management in many 
cases. Following GAAP cases, and especially when highly-cited, I observe evidence of real 
earnings management in terms of abnormally low CFO and discretionary expenses. Interestingly, 
I frequently observe a significant reduction in abnormal production costs, which is consistent with 
decreased rather than increased real earnings management. Overall, the evidence here indicates 
that private litigation may lead firms to increase efforts to manage earnings through real 
activities, an interesting and unintended effect. 
 
 
Stock Return Characteristic Tests 
 Table 10 presents results of regressions of stock return volatility, stock return skewness, 
and minimum 1-day returns. The results are mixed, with significant changes in stock return 
characteristics consistent with both increased and decreased litigation risk. For sued firms, 
lawsuits without GAAP allegations are associated with the most risk-reducing changes, with 
significantly lower return volatility and significantly more positive (i.e. less negative) minimum 
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1-day returns. Cases with GAAP allegations that settle are associated with more positively 
skewed returns, but also higher volatility.  
For industry peers, GAAP litigation is associated with lower volatility and less negative 
minimum 1-day returns, but the incremental effects are opposite for highly-cited settlements. 
Also, non-GAAP lawsuits, highly-cited GAAP dismissals, and auditor lawsuits are all associated 
with significantly more negatively skewed returns. For shared auditor peers, significant results are 
almost uniformly in the direction of higher litigation risk, with more return volatility and more 
negative minimum 1-day returns. The exception is auditor defendant lawsuits, where I observe 
lower volatility and less negative minimum 1-day returns for shared auditor peers after lawsuits. 
What is clear from these tests is that private lawsuits are associated with significant 
shockwaves that ripple through the stock returns of sued firms and their peers. Whatever changes 
managers may make in response to litigation, they appear to have significant stock market 
consequences. In cases where managers appear successful at lowering litigation risk by reducing 
volatility, negative skewness, and/or sharp 1-day returns, are shareholders unambiguously better 
off? On the one hand, they face less risk of losses associated with litigation, but it is also possible 
that earnings are less informative. This raises questions currently beyond the scope of this paper, 
but serves to highlight the potentially far-reaching impact of private securities litigation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 I attempt measure the consequences of the increased trend of private litigation targeting 
alleged violations of GAAP. I find that private litigation has a significant and sometimes 
unexpected impact on sued firms and their industry and shared auditor peers. The largest category 
of GAAP allegations relates to revenue recognition, and firms often respond directly to these 
lawsuits. Generally, class action litigation leads firms to significantly reduce their discretionary 
revenue recognition, but some cases are actually associated with more aggressive revenue 
recognition by industry peers. The fact that the outcome of litigation can lead to such different 
effects highlights the important role of courts, which generally lack accounting expertise, in 
shaping accounting practices. With respect to another large category of GAAP allegations, 
improper asset impairment recognition, I find changes in sued firms differ sharply depending on 
lawsuit outcome, but that for peer firms there are few discernible changes associated with specific 
asset impairment allegations. But I do find some significant NSPI reporting changes in peer firms 
following other GAAP and non-GAAP lawsuits.   
I find similarly unpredictable patterns related to other, less direct financial reporting 
changes after private litigation. Indeed, perhaps an important result of this study is that litigation 
and its consequences are unpredictable. First, I find both significant increases and decreases in the 
propensity to meet or beat analysts’ expectations, but in general there is a shift away from 
meeting or beating by a few cents or less towards beating by larger margins. Second, I find that 
following litigation, firms often exhibit a shift towards real earnings management, which occurs 
most often through acceleration of sales and/or reduction of discretionary expenses. This is a 
rational means for managers to minimize litigation risk while still managing earnings, but it could 
involve long term costs for shareholders and does not necessarily further the goals of securities 
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regulators. And once again, results can be unpredictable, with real earnings management also 
decreasing in some instances. 
Finally, I find that private litigation is associated with changes in stock return 
characteristics, specifically volatility, skewness, and minimum 1-day returns, but in different 
directions depending on the attributes and outcome of the case. While the exact interpretation is 
unclear, these results indicate that private litigation creates far-reaching disruptions in the 
financial reporting environment. 
 Overall, my results highlight that U.S. accounting standards exist within our complex 
legal system, which allows private actors to act as regulators, and these private actors have 
increasingly been interested in GAAP violations. This has a significant impact in how standards 
are implemented. Notably, private lawsuits tend to focus on a few areas of GAAP. This is a signal 
that these are important and contentious areas, but could also indicate that other areas of GAAP 
may be neglected in terms of enforcement. In any case, standard-setters should be particularly 
cognizant of the potential effects of private lawsuits when working in these areas.  
Standard setters and practitioners should be aware that the judicial system operates from 
a perspective far different from the conceptual framework. Judges do not officially determine 
whether a GAAP provision has been violated or not, but instead care whether there has been an 
apparent violation of the law. Therefore plaintiffs focus on the ability to satisfy needed elements 
of their case, which generally requires a) a substantial stock price decline that can be tied to the 
accounting misbehavior, and b) some readily obtainable evidence that the managers acted 
intentionally. It is these factors that will determine which potential violations are brought to court 
and how the case fares. For their part, judges should think carefully about the perspective and 
objectives of standard-setters before creating precedent with far-reaching implications for GAAP.   
In the realm of revenue recognition standards, the private enforcement regime appears to 
work relatively well, but my results suggest improvements may be needed in other areas. Since 
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asset impairment questions frequently generate legal controversy, with ambiguous results, there 
could be a need for clearer guidance to practitioners and managers in this area. For example, it is 
difficult for plaintiffs to know when goodwill should be impaired ex ante, and they may only be 
able to sue after an impairment has been recognized. This means both that enforcement happens 
too late and that managers could be deterred from recognizing the impairment at all. If firms were 
required to periodically disclose individual factors of the impairment decision, such as expected 
cash flows related to important assets, private litigants could act as better watchdogs.  
These are complicated questions that would clearly involve important costs as well as 
benefits. The key point is that for standard setters to create the most effective accounting rules, 
they should keep in mind that private attorneys and non-accountant judges may be the most likely 
enforcers of those rules, and this enforcement can lead to far-reaching, unpredictable, and perhaps 
unintended consequences. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLES 
 
Table 1 
GAAP Lawsuits by Year 
 
 
 
year GAAP Non-GAAP Total % GAAP
1983 0 2 2 0.00
1984 1 3 4 0.25
1985 0 3 3 0.00
1986 0 2 2 0.00
1987 0 1 1 0.00
1988 0 6 6 0.00
1989 1 9 10 0.10
1990 3 11 14 0.21
1991 3 8 11 0.27
1992 7 12 19 0.37
1993 5 18 23 0.22
1994 22 39 61 0.36
1995 23 42 65 0.35
1996 29 15 44 0.66
1997 40 23 63 0.63
1998 57 38 95 0.60
1999 58 41 99 0.59
2000 67 31 98 0.68
2001 51 31 82 0.62
2002 59 35 94 0.63
2003 59 44 103 0.57
2004 85 44 129 0.66
2005 65 29 94 0.69
2006 43 21 64 0.67
2007 47 46 93 0.51
2008 45 38 83 0.54
2009 31 37 68 0.46
2010 25 40 65 0.38
2011 25 46 71 0.35
Total 854 731 1585 0.54
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Table 2 
GAAP and Non-GAAP Settlement Percentage by Year 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Percent Settled GAAP Percent Settled Non-GAAP GAAP - Non-GAAP
1983 0.00 1.00 -1.00
1984 1.00 1.00 0.00
1985 0.00 0.67 -0.67
1986 0.00 1.00 -1.00
1987 0.00 1.00 -1.00
1988 0.00 0.75 -0.75
1989 1.00 1.00 0.00
1990 1.00 0.89 0.11
1991 0.67 0.75 -0.08
1992 1.00 0.89 0.11
1993 1.00 0.94 0.06
1994 0.86 0.74 0.13
1995 0.96 0.90 0.05
1996 0.72 0.60 0.12
1997 0.75 0.64 0.11
1998 0.74 0.37 0.37
1999 0.63 0.43 0.21
2000 0.64 0.39 0.25
2001 0.76 0.48 0.28
2002 0.66 0.46 0.20
2003 0.63 0.42 0.21
2004 0.60 0.51 0.09
2005 0.50 0.31 0.19
2006 0.69 0.38 0.31
2007 0.53 0.25 0.28
2008 0.54 0.42 0.12
2009 0.32 0.24 0.07
2010 0.25 0.15 0.10
2011 0.17 0.09 0.08
43 
 
 
Table 3 
GAAP Lawsuits by Industry and Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Industry Group Name SIC Code 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Metal Mining 10 - 1 - - - - 1 - - 1 3
Coal & Lignite Mining 12 - - - - - - - 1 - - 1
Oil & Gas 13 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - 3
Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 16 1 - - - - 1 - - 1 - 3
Food and Kindred Products 20 2 - - - 3 1 - 2 1 3 12
Tobacco Products 21 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
Textile Mill Products 22 - - 1 - 1 - - - - - 2
Apperel and other Finished Products Made from Fabrics 23 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 - 1 - 12
Lumber and Wood Products, except furniture 24 - - 1 1 - 1 - - - 1 4
Furniture and Fixtures 25 - - - - - - - - - 1 1
Paper and Allied Products 26 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 - 1 1 1 - 1 - - - 1 5
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 1 1 2 5 5 - 2 3 5 4 28
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 - - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - 4
Leather And Leather Products 31 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 32 - - - - - 1 1 - - - 2
Primary Metal Industries 33 - - 1 - - 1 1 - - - 3
Fabricated Metal Products 34 - 1 - - - 1 - - - 2 4
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 35 9 8 5 4 9 2 3 3 2 5 50
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components 36 - 1 4 2 3 6 5 7 8 9 45
 Transportation Equipment 37 - - 6 3 1 1 1 - - 12
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments 38 - - 3 5 1 1 2 1 1 3 17
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 1 2 - 1 1 - - 1 1 - 7
 Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 42 - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 2
 Water Transportation 44 - - - - 1 - - - 2 - 3
 Transportation Services 47 1 - - - 1 - 2 - - - 4
 Communications 48 - 2 - - 4 1 5 1 1 1 15
 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 49 - - 1 - 2 3 6 4 3 - 19
 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 50 - - 3 3 - 2 1 - - 1 10
 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 51 1 - 1 - 1 - - - 2 1 6
 General Merchandise Stores 53 - 1 - - - 1 1 1 1 - 5
 Food Stores 54 - - - - - 1 2 - 1 - 4
 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 55 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
 Apparel And Accessory Stores 56 - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 2
 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 57 - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 2
 Eating And Drinking Places 58 - - 2 - - - - - 1 2 5
 Miscellaneous Retail 59 2 1 2 2 2 2 - 1 2 2 16
 Depository Institutions 60 1 - - 2 1 2 4 2 - 1 13
 Non-depository Credit Institutions 61 - - 4 1 2 1 2 3 - 1 14
 Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges 62 - - - - - - 2 1 - 3
 Insurance Carriers 63 1 2 4 3 3 2 - 2 2 4 23
 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 64 - - 1 1 - - - - 1 2 5
 Real Estate 65 - - - - 1 - - - - - 1
 Holding And Other Investment Offices 67 - - - 1 2 - - - - 1 4
 Personal Services 72 - - - - - 1 - - - - 1
 Business Services 73 1 11 10 11 17 11 7 15 19 9 111
 Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 75 - - - - - - - 1 - - 1
 Motion Pictures 78 - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 3
 Amusement And Recreation Services 79 - 2 1 - - - - - - - 3
 Health Services 80 3 4 2 1 1 - 3 1 5 - 20
 Educational Services 82 - - 2 - - - 1 1 2 - 6
 Social Services 83 - - - 1 - - - - - - 1
 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management 87 - - - 1 - 1 2 - 5 - 9
 Nonclassifiable Establishments 99 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
Total 25 39 57 56 67 49 56 55 75 56 535
Year
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Table 4 
GAAP Violations Alleged in Private Securities Class Actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cited Standards
SFAC 5, SFAS 48, SAB 101 and 104, SOP 97-2, SOP 
81-1, EITF 00-21, ARB 43 Ch.1, APB 10, AAER 817 
and 812, SFAS 5, APB 29
SFAS 5
12 SFAS 5
48 SFAS 5
20 SFAS 5
14 SFAS 5
79 SFAS 5
34 ARB 43 Ch.4 St.5, APB 12
16 SFAS 142, SFAS 121
11 SFAS 115, SFAS 91, SFAS 114
20 SFAS 144, SFAS 121
SOP 98-1, SOP 97-3, SFAS 71, SFAS 2,  SFAS 86
APB 22
SOP 94-6
SFAS 109
SFAS 13
APB 17, SFAS 71, SFAS 2, FIN 4
SFAS 57
APB 16
APB 18
FIN 46(R), SFAS 140, SFAS 125, SFAS 47, ARB 51, 
SFAS 94, EITF 96-20, EITF 96-21
SFAS 133
APB 29
APB 20, APB 9
SFAS 123, APB 25, SFAS 109
SAB 74
SFAS 113
SFAS 131, APB 30
SFAS 52
SFAC 1, SFAC 2
Improper "Cookie Jar" Reserves
Nature of Alleged Violation Number of Cases
Improper Revenue Recognition 182
Improper Contingent Reserves, All 153
Loan Loss Reserves
Uncollectible Accounts Reserve
Sales Returns Reserve
Failure to Disclose Risks 14
Other/General Contingent Reserve
Failure to Write-Down Assets, All 81
Inventory Write-down
Goodwill or Intangible Asset Impairment
Impairment of Securities
Other Long-Term Asset Impairment
Improper Expense Capitalization 23
Failure to Disclose Accounting Policies 27
Accounting for Income Taxes 13
Lease Accounting 13
Understated Amortization or Depreciation 13
Related-Party Transaction Disclosure 12
Mergers and Acquisitions 11
Failure to Consolidate Related Entities 7
Off-Balance Sheet Liabilities or Assets 6
Derivative Accounting 5
Nonmonetary Transactions 5
Failure to Restate Financial Statements 5
Stock Option Accounting 4
Failure to Disclose Impact of Accounting Changes 2
General Conceptual Principles 135
No specific standards cited 83
Roundtrip Reinsurance Transaction 2
Business Segment Reporting 2
Foreign Currency Translation Gains and Losses 1
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Table 5 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Definition
DiscRev discretionary revenues as in Stubben (2010). Calculated as the residual from the following regression, 
run industry and year:  (AR i,q  + AR i,q-1  + AR i,q-2  + AR i,q-3 ) - ( AR i,q-4  + AR i,q-5  + AR i,q-6  + AR i,q-7 ) 
= α + β1(REV i,q  - REV i,q-4 ) +                                                                                                                          
β2[(REV i,q-1  + REV i,q-2  + REV i,q-3 ) - (REV i,q-5  + REV i,q-6 + REV i,q-7 )] + ɛ
NSPI_YN indicator variable equal to 1 in each firm-quarter where a negative special item is reported on the 
income statement.
NSPI_size size of NSPI reported in each firm-quarter (in millions), scaled by income before extraordinary items.
LMB_YN frequency of meeting or beating analysts’ estimates, measured as the percentage of current quarter and 
next three quarters in which earnings meets or exceeds the average forecast of analysts in I/B/E/S by 
more than $0.03.
SMB_YN frequency of meeting or beating analysts’ estimates, measured as the percentage of current quarter and 
next three quarters in which earnings meets or exceeds by $0.03 or less the average forecast of 
analysts in I/B/E/S.
Abnorm_CFO Abnormal Cash Flows from Operations, defined as actual CFO minus predicted CFO using estimated 
coefficients from the regression:  CFO it /Assets i,t-1  = k 1t  (1/ Assets i,t-1 ) + k 2 (Sales it / Assets i,t-1 ) + 
k 3 (Δ Sales it  / Assets i,t-1 ) + ε it .
Abnorm_prod Abnormal production costs, where production costs equals COGS plus Δinventory, defined as actual 
production costs minus predicted production costs using estimated coefficients from the regression: 
Prod it /Assets i,t-1  = k 1t  (1/ Assets i,t-1 ) + k 2 (Sales it / Assets i,t-1 ) + k 3 (Δ Sales it  / Assets i,t-1 ) + 
k 3 (Δ Sales i,t-1  / Assets i,t-1 ) + ε it .
Abnorm_disc_exp Abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses equals R&D expense plus SG&A, 
defined as actual discretionary expenses minus predicted discretionary expenses using estimated 
coefficients from the regression: Disc_exp  it /Assets i,t-1  = k 1t  (1/ Assets i,t-1 ) +                                                               
k 2 (Sales i,t-1 / Assets i,t-1 ) + ε it .
Std_ret standard deviation of quarterly firm stock returns 
Ret_skewness skewness of quarterly firm stock returns
Min_ret minimum daily firm market-adjusted stock return in each firm-quarter
Pre_sued = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the 8 quarters prior to a lawsuit filing against that firm.
Post_settle/dismiss = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the quarter of a firm’s lawsuit settlement/dismissal and the following 
8 quarters.
Pre_sued_ind = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the 8 quarters prior to a lawsuit against another firm in the same 2-
digit SIC industry and market decile.
Post_ind_settle/dismiss = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the quarter of a settlement or dismissal of a lawsuit against another 
firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry and market decile and the following 8 quarters.
Pre_sued_aud = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the 8 quarters prior to the filing of a lawsuit against another firm 
with the same auditor headquartered in the same judicial circuit.
Post_aud_settle/dismiss = 1 for firm-quarter observations in the quarter of the settlement/dismissal of a lawsuit against another 
firm with the same auditor headquartered in the same judicial circuit and the following 8 quarters.
Pre_GAAP_suit = Pre_sued *1 if the lawsuit contains GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_GAAP_settle/dismiss = Post_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise. 
Pre_ind_GAAP = Pre_sued_ind *1 if the lawsuit contains GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_ind_GAAP_settle/dismiss = Post_ind_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise.
Pre_aud_GAAP = Pre_sued_aud *1 if the lawsuit contains GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_aud_GAAP_settle/dismiss = Post_aud_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained GAAP allegations and *0 otherwise. 
Pre_revrec_suit = Pre_sued *1 if the lawsuit contains revenue recognition allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_revrec_settle/dismiss = Post_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained revenue recognition allegations and *0 
otherwise. 
Pre_ind_revrec = Pre_sued_ind *1 if the lawsuit contains revenue recognition allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_ind_revrec_settle/dismiss = Post_ind_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained revenue recognition allegations and *0 
otherwise. 
Pre_aud_revrec = Pre_sued_aud *1 if the lawsuit contains revenue recognition allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_aud_revrec_settle/dismiss = Post_aud_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained revenue recognition allegations and *0 
otherwise. 
46 
 
Table 5 Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Name Definition
Pre_writedown_suit = Pre_sued *1 if the lawsuit contains asset impairment recognition allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_writedown_settle/dismiss = Post_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained asset impairment recognition allegations and 
*0 otherwise. 
Pre_ind_writedown = Pre_sued_ind *1 if the lawsuit contains asset impairment recognition allegations and *0 otherwise.
Post_ind_writedown_settle/dismiss = Post_ind_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained asset impairment recognition allegations 
and *0 otherwise. 
Pre_aud_writedown = Pre_sued_aud *1 if the lawsuit contains asset impairment recognition allegations and *0 otherwise. 
Post_aud_writedown_settle/dismiss = Post_aud_settle/dismiss *1 if the resolved lawsuit contained asset impairment recognition allegations 
and *0 otherwise. 
GAAP_cites for cases with GAAP allegations, the number of times per year a judicial opinion on a motion to dismiss 
and any appellate decision(s) are cited by future judicial opinions and court documents.  
RevRec_cites for cases with revenue recognition allegations, the number of times per year a judicial opinion on a 
motion to dismiss and any appellate decision(s) are cited by future judicial opinions and court documents.  
Writedown_cites for cases with asset impairment allegations, the number of times per year a judicial opinion on a motion 
to dismiss and any appellate decision(s) are cited by future judicial opinions and court documents.  
ROA Return On Assets, defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the prior period total assets.
Salesgrowth change in sales from the same quarter in the previous year, scaled by total assets in the same quarter in 
the previous year.
MTB Market capitalization divided by book value of equity.
Size the natural log of market capitalization.
Age the number of years the firm has appeared in Compustat up to the current firm-quarter.
Leverage total long term debt divided by total assets.
Goodwill goodwill reported on the balance sheet scaled by total assets.
Num_analyst number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm for each firm-quarter.
Std_ret_mkt standard deviation of the CRSP value-weighted market return for each quarter 
AveVol average volume of shares traded for each firm quarter (total volume/average shares outstanding)
DP ratio of dividends paid in the quarter to market value of equity
EP ratio of income before extraordinary items to market value of equity
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Table 6  
Changes in Discretionary Revenues following Private Litigation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sued Firm Industry Peers Shared Auditor Peers
Post_settle - Pre_settle -0.0134 -0.00452*** -0.00158
P-Value 0.176 0.00937 0.270
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss -0.0113** -0.00569*** -0.00248*
P-Value 0.0393 0.000 0.0969
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle -0.0179 -0.000322 -0.000554
P-Value 0.197 0.927 0.691
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss -0.00155 -0.00323* 0.000347
P-Value 0.871 0.0907 0.861
Post_revrec_settle - Pre_revrec_settle 0.00321 -0.00310** -0.00199
P-Value 0.739 0.050 0.134
Post_revrec_dismiss - Pre_revrec_dismiss -0.00386 0.00526 -0.00198
P-Value 0.856 0.194 0.189
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.00377 -0.00570*** -0.000434
P-Value 0.628 0.000 0.336
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites 0.00385 0.00157** 0.000300
P-Value 0.358 0.0109 0.616
Post_revrec_settle*Cites - Pre_revrec_settle*Cites -0.00884 0.00495*** 0.000411
P-Value 0.308 0.00215 0.562
Post_revrec_dismiss*Cites - Pre_revrec_dismiss*Cites -0.00681 -0.00152 0.000855
P-Value 0.505 0.225 0.423
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def 0.00648 -0.000476 0.000976
P-Value 0.433 0.665 0.397
Observations 185,473 185,473 185,473
R-squared 0.169 0.170 0.169
Disc_Rev i,q  = β 1  + β 2 Pre_settle i,q  + β 3 Post_Settle i,q  + β 4 Pre_dismiss i,q + β 5 Post_dismiss i,q  + β 6 Pre_GAAP_settle i,q  + β 7 Post_GAAP_settle i,q  
+ β 8 Pre_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 9 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 10 Pre_RevRec_settle i,q   + β 11 Post_RevRec_settle i,q  +β 12 Pre_RevRec_dismiss i,q   + 
β 13 Post_RevRec_dismiss i,q  + β 14 Pre_GAAP _settle i,q *Cites  + β 15 Post_GAAP_settle i,q *Cites  + β 16 Pre_GAAP _dismiss i,q *Cites + 
β 17 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q  *Cites + β 18 Pre_ RevRec _settle i,q *Cites + β 19 Post_RevRec_settle i,q *Cites + β 20 Pre_RevRec_dismiss i,q *Cites+ 
β 21 Post_RevRec_dismiss i,q *Cites + β 22 Pre_auditor_def i,q  + β 23 Post_auditor_def i,q  +  Σγ k Controls k,i,q  + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + 
ε i,q
Table 4 presents results derived from OLS regressions of the form displayed above. The results displayed represent the difference between the 
applicable post- and pre-litigation coefficient, followed by the P-value of an F-test of the form Post_variable-Pre-variable =0. The pre- and post-
litigation variables are indicator variables based on the presence and characteristics of lawsuits in two year periods before a lawsuit is filed or after a 
lawsuit is resolved. The regression includes industry-, judicial circuit-, and year fixed effects. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables as defined in Table 3.
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Table 7 
Changes in Propensity and Mean of Negative Special Item Reporting following Private Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSPI_YN NSPI_size NSPI_YN NSPI_size NSPI_YN NSPI_size
Post_settle - Pre_settle 0.189 0.00503 0.0788 0.00752 0.0375 0.00104
P-Value 0.275 0.733 0.162 0.145 0.400 0.306
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss -0.0446 0.0110 0.174*** -0.00888*** 0.0741* 0.000
P-Value 0.806 0.102 0.00101 0.00125 0.0902 0.985
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle -0.313 -0.0226 0.0513 -0.00920* 0.0753* -0.000360
P-Value 0.205 0.138 0.433 0.0970 0.0645 0.730
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss 0.0506 -0.00664 0.00843 0.00873*** 0.0433 0.000501
P-Value 0.849 0.527 0.899 0.00313 0.449 0.525
Post_writedown_settle - Pre_writedown_settle -0.573 0.0299** -0.00469 -0.00284 -0.000391 0.000882
P-Value 0.178 0.0148 0.962 0.471 0.993 0.195
Post_writedown_dismiss - Pre_writedown_dismiss 0.599 -0.0331* 0.0934 -0.00746 -0.0973 -0.000761
P-Value 0.413 0.0569 0.293 0.138 0.242 0.642
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.0523 0.00194 0.00806 0.000705 0.0168 -0.000485*
P-Value 0.782 0.661 0.707 0.671 0.464 0.0650
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites 0.0108 0.00180 0.00895 0.000827 0.000635 -0.000210
P-Value 0.941 0.771 0.830 0.673 0.974 0.365
Post_writedown_settle*Cites - Pre_writedown_settle*Cites 0.276 0.000710 0.0470 -0.000735 -0.0181 0.000
P-Value 0.292 0.941 0.307 0.820 0.621 0.942
Post_writedown_dismiss*Cites - Pre_writedown_dismiss*Cites -0.457 0.0158 -0.00766 -0.000516 0.0862* 0.000216
P-Value 0.255 0.206 0.877 0.757 0.0531 0.849
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def 0.519* 0.0105 -0.397*** 0.0239*** -0.117** -0.000944
P-Value 0.0984 0.215 0.000 0.00703 0.0145 0.363
Observations 238,765 52,711 238,765 52,711 216,613 235,477
Pseudo R-squared/ R-squared 0.090 0.270 0.093 0.273 0.097 0.066
Table 5 presents results derived from logit (for propensity) and OLS (for size) regressions of the form displayed above. The results displayed represent the difference 
between the applicable post- and pre-litigation coefficient, followed by the P-value of an F-test of the form Post_variable-Pre-variable =0. The pre- and post-litigation 
variables are indicator variables based on the presence and characteristics of lawsuits in two year periods before a lawsuit is filed or after a lawsuit is resolved. The 
regression includes industry-, judicial circuit-, and year fixed effects. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables as defined in Table 3.
Firm Industry Auditor
NSPI_YN i,q /Mean_NSPI i,q  = β 1  + β 2 Pre_settle i,q  + β 3 Post_Settle i,q  + β 4 Pre_dismiss i,q + β 5 Post_dismiss i,q  + β 6 Pre_GAAP_settle i,q  + β 7 Post_GAAP_settle i,q   + 
β 8 Pre_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 9 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 10 Pre_writedown_settle i,q   + β 11 Post_writedown_settle i,q  +β 12 Pre_writedown_dismiss i,q   + 
β 13 Post_writedown_dismiss i,q  + β 14 Pre_GAAP _settle i,q *Cites  + β 15 Post_GAAP_settle i,q *Cites  + β 16 Pre_GAAP _dismiss i,q *Cites + β 17 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q 
*Cites + β 18 Pre_ writedown _settle i,q *Cites + β 19 Post_ writedown _settle i,q *Cites + β 20 Pre_ writedown _dismiss i,q *Cites+ β 21 Post_ writedown _dismiss i,q *Cites + 
β 22 Pre_auditor_def i,q  + β 23 Post_auditor_def i,q  +  Σγ k Controls k,i,q  + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + ε i,q
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Table 8 
Changes in Propensity to Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts following Private Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large MorB Small MorB Large MorB Small MorB Large MorB Small MorB
Post_settle - Pre_settle -0.465*** 0.253 -0.0572 0.0181 0.0355 -0.0534
P-Value 0.00797 0.255 0.534 0.831 0.564 0.379
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss 0.0154 0.189* 0.00798 -0.00894 0.083* -0.0561**
P-Value 0.906 0.0849 0.832 0.859 0.0569 0.0486
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle 0.728*** -0.408 0.0235 -0.0288 0.109** -0.0473
P-Value 0.000549 0.142 0.806 0.788 0.0245 0.380
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_settle 0.528* -0.171 0.118* 0.0325 0.00584 0.0524
P-Value 0.0725 0.482 0.0529 0.552 0.855 0.148
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.0362 0.127 0.0766* -0.0629*** 0.0179 -0.0126
P-Value 0.749 0.216 0.0687 0.00216 0.142 0.219
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites -0.00779 0.00714 0.0323* -0.0521*** 0.0240* -0.0124
P-Value 0.948 0.940 0.0717 0.000143 0.0565 0.233
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def 1.070* -0.987** -0.119* 0.152*** -0.112* 0.112***
P-Value 0.0753 0.0113 0.100 0.000113 0.0949 0.00612
Observations 129,391 129,391 129,391 129,391 129,391 129,391
Pseudo R-squared 0.053 0.065 0.054 0.066 0.053 0.065
Table 6 presents results derived from logit regressions of the form displayed above. The results displayed represent the difference between the applicable post- and 
pre-litigation coefficient, followed by the P-value of an F-test of the form Post_variable-Pre-variable =0. The pre- and post-litigation variables are indicator 
variables based on the presence and characteristics of lawsuits in two year periods before a lawsuit is filed or after a lawsuit is resolved. The regression includes 
industry-, judicial circuit-, and year fixed effects. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables as defined in Table 3.
Firm Industry Auditor
LMB_YN i,q /SMB_YN i,q  = β 1  + β 2 Pre_settle i,q  + β 3 Post_Settle i,q  + β 4 Pre_dismiss i,q + β 5 Post_dismiss i,q  + β 6 Pre_GAAP_settle i,q  + β 7 Post_GAAP_settle i,q  
+ β 8 Pre_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 9 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 10 Pre_GAAP _settle i,q *Cites  + β 11 Post_GAAP_settle i,q *Cites  + β 12 Pre_GAAP _dismiss i,q *Cites 
+ β 13 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q  *Cites + β 14 Pre_auditor_def i,q  + β 15 Post_auditor_def i,q  +   Σγ k Controls k,i,q  + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + ε i,q
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Table 9  
Changes in Real Earnings Management following Private Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Sued Firms
Abnormal_CFO Abnormal_Prod Abnormal_DiscExp
Post_settle - Pre_settle 0.00210 0.0130 -0.00142
P-Value 0.434 0.525 0.855
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss -0.000335 0.00690 0.000123
P-Value 0.730 0.536 0.979
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle -0.00197 -0.00431 0.00147
P-Value 0.445 0.840 0.869
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss 0.000539 0.00403 -0.000366
P-Value 0.661 0.740 0.952
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites -0.00128** 0.0123*** 0.00673*
P-Value 0.0418 0.00607 0.0845
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites 0.000382 -0.00772 -0.00188
P-Value 0.561 0.238 0.426
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def -0.00341** 0.0588*** 0.0253***
P-Value 0.0141 0.00960 0.000771
Observations 164,769 164,769 164,769
R-squared 0.253 0.394 0.340
Panel B: Industry Peers
Abnormal_CFO Abnormal_Prod Abnormal_DiscExp
Post_settle - Pre_settle 0.00207** -0.0127* -0.00916**
P-Value 0.0179 0.0715 0.0118
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss 0.00107 -0.00740* -0.00527*
P-Value 0.215 0.0764 0.0751
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle -0.00163* 0.00290 0.00434
P-Value 0.0553 0.618 0.192
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss 0.000681 -0.00502 -0.00202
P-Value 0.136 0.181 0.395
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites -0.000263 -0.00319*** -0.00126***
P-Value 0.265 0.00161 0.00647
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites -0.000186* 0.000780 0.00102**
P-Value 0.0871 0.345 0.0158
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def -0.000510 0.00735*** 0.00128
P-Value 0.280 0.000440 0.291
Observations 164,769 164,769 164,769
R-squared 0.256 0.395 0.342
Abnorm_CFO i,q /Abnorm_Prod i,q /Abnorm_DiscExp i,q  = β 1  + β 2 Pre_settle i,q  + β 3 Post_Settle i,q  + β 4 Pre_dismiss i,q + 
β 5 Post_dismiss i,q  + β 6 Pre_GAAP_settle i,q  + β 7 Post_GAAP_settle i,q   + β 8 Pre_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + β 9 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q   + 
β 10 Pre_GAAP _settle i,q *Cites  + β 11 Post_GAAP_settle i,q *Cites  + β 12 Pre_GAAP _dismiss i,q *Cites + β 13 Post_GAAP_dismiss i,q 
*Cites + β 14 Pre_auditor_def i,q  + β 15 Post_auditor_def i,q  + Σγ k Controls k,i,q  + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + ε i,q
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Table 9 Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Shared Auditor Peers
Abnormal_CFO Abnormal_Prod Abnormal_DiscExp
Post_settle - Pre_settle -0.00117 -0.00235 -0.000201
P-Value 0.145 0.463 0.902
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss 0.00133** -0.00112 -0.00184
P-Value 0.0206 0.721 0.257
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle 0.00109 -0.000273 -0.000879
P-Value 0.139 0.920 0.546
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss -0.000370 -0.00634*** -0.00274**
P-Value 0.488 0.00620 0.0332
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.000 -0.00177** -0.000406
P-Value 0.601 0.0217 0.193
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites -0.000159* -0.000127 0.000297
P-Value 0.0996 0.872 0.468
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def -0.00225** 0.00948** 0.00432*
P-Value 0.0229 0.0209 0.0843
Observations 164,769 164,769 164,769
R-squared 0.255 0.394 0.341
Table 7 presents results derived from OLS regressions of the form displayed above. The results displayed represent the difference 
between the applicable post- and pre-litigation coefficient, followed by the P-value of an F-test of the form Post_variable-Pre-
variable =0. The pre- and post-litigation variables are indicator variables based on the presence and characteristics of lawsuits in two 
year periods before a lawsuit is filed or after a lawsuit is resolved. The regression includes industry-, judicial circuit-, and year fixed 
effects. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. All variables as defined in Table 3.
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Table 10 
Changes in Stock Return Characteristics following Private Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Sued Firms
Std_Ret Skew_Ret Min_Ret
Post_settle - Pre_settle -0.00206 -0.0756 0.00613
P-Value 0.214 0.237 0.164
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss -0.00171** 0.0735 0.00677**
P-Value 0.0129 0.287 0.0117
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle 0.00470*** 0.257*** -0.00549
P-Value 0.00275 0.000311 0.330
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss 0.00237 0.162 0.00175
P-Value 0.294 0.151 0.600
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites -0.000521 0.0410 0.00376
P-Value 0.667 0.209 0.160
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites -0.000670 -0.0239 0.000
P-Value 0.422 0.477 0.992
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def 0.000422 -0.0404 -0.00184
P-Value 0.815 0.705 0.661
Observations 219,417 219,415 219,418
R-squared 0.533 0.033 0.386
Panel B: Industry Peers
Std_Ret Skew_Ret Min_Ret
Post_settle - Pre_settle 0.000877 -0.0199** -0.00304
P-Value 0.421 0.0485 0.241
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss 0.000267 -0.0434*** -0.00159
P-Value 0.804 0.000134 0.515
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle -0.00190** -0.0147 0.00388**
P-Value 0.0178 0.578 0.0135
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss -0.000285 0.0215 0.000627
P-Value 0.854 0.113 0.843
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.00113*** -0.00749* -0.00259**
P-Value 0.00422 0.0525 0.0159
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites 0.000 -0.00658 -0.000418
P-Value 0.956 0.122 0.136
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def -0.00313*** -0.0309** 0.00811***
P-Value 0.000 0.0297 0.000
Observations 219,417 219,415 219,418
R-squared 0.534 0.033 0.387
Std_reti,q/Ret_skewnessi,q/Min_reti,q = β1 + β2Pre_settlei,q + β3Post_Settlei,q + β4Pre_dismissi,q+ β5Post_dismissi,q + 
β6Pre_GAAP_settlei,q + β7Post_GAAP_settlei,q  + β8Pre_GAAP_dismissi,q  + β9Post_GAAP_dismissi,q  + β10Pre_GAAP 
_settlei,q*Cites  + β11Post_GAAP_settlei,q*Cites  + β12Pre_GAAP _dismissi,q*Cites + β13Post_GAAP_dismissi,q *Cites + 
β14Pre_auditor_defi,q + β15Post_auditor_defi,q + ΣγkControlsk,i,q + Industry_FE + Circuit_FE + Year_FE + εi,q
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Table 10 Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Shared Auditor Peers
Std_Ret Skew_Ret Min_Ret
Post_settle - Pre_settle 0.000980* 0.0154 -0.00227**
P-Value 0.0677 0.327 0.0458
Post_dismiss - Pre_dismiss 0.000572 0.0110 0.000
P-Value 0.257 0.349 0.914
Post_GAAP_settle - Pre_GAAP_settle 0.000318 0.00770 0.000672
P-Value 0.523 0.588 0.656
Post_GAAP_dismiss - Pre_GAAP_dismiss 0.00152*** 0.00640 -0.00294**
P-Value 0.00551 0.687 0.0150
Post_GAAP_settle*Cites - Pre_GAAP_settle*Cites 0.000197*** -0.00306 -0.000601***
P-Value 0.00315 0.320 0.000390
Post_GAAP_dismiss*Cites - Pre_GAAP_dismiss*Cites 0.000 -0.00495 -0.000307
P-Value 0.597 0.358 0.362
Post_auditor_def - Pre_auditor_def -0.00146*** -0.00345 0.00463***
P-Value 0.000998 0.692 0.000183
Observations 219,417 219,415 219,418
R-squared 0.534 0.033 0.387
Table 8 presents results derived from OLS regressions of the form displayed above. The results displayed represent the difference between 
the applicable post- and pre-litigation coefficient, followed by the P-value of an F-test of the form Post_variable-Pre-variable=0. The pre- and 
post-litigation variables are indicator variables based on the presence and characteristics of lawsuits in two year periods before a lawsuit is 
filed or after a lawsuit is resolved. The regression includes industry-, judicial circuit-, and year fixed effects. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables as 
defined in Table 3.
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